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5 June 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Operational Meeting with ABRASOVANY 2 and 15

1. A meeting to discuss the proposed contact operation into the Ukrainian SSR was held at the home of ABRASOVANY 15 on 29 May 1996. The agenda included:

A. Contact with identity known to ABRASOVANY 2 in the LYOV post office. The contact, if still living, would be in a position of high authority in the postal service located in LYOV.

B. The possible utilization of a courier between GDAWOW, Poland and LYOV. This is a railroad employee.

C. The possible utilization of a courier between LYOV and KIEV. ABRASOVANY is in possession of information received by letter that a "transport" driver, probably truck, makes three trips a week to KIEV at which time he also engages in clandestine activities with gift material received from the United States.

D. Various other contacts among the lower echelon of the Soviet Postal Service in Western Ukrainian villages and towns, many of whom were underground members or sympathizers.

E. The recruitment trip undertaken by ABRASOVANY 4 within the United States; the recruiting potential of the OSM/Polynk group; and the action-agent potential in Australia.

F. The existence of a bookkeeper in KHORNIK employed by a sugar combine. Has a brother in the U. S. and has indicated through personal letters of interest in liberation work. ABRASOVANY 2 feels that this man would accept a contact or courier.

G. ABRASOVANY 2 arrived from New York City at 1140 hours. Contact was established at 1830 and terminated at 1700 hours. The meeting was held in an air of congenial agreement and indicated that ABRASOVANY is willing to place his internal contacts at our disposal to facilitate the receipt of information regarding the internal situation in the Ukraine which would aid ABRASOVANY 2 in his capacity as foreign representative of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council in the Ukraine.

3. The first topic of discussion was the LYOV postal contact. The undersigned informed ABRASOVANY 2 that preliminary discussions have aroused the interest of our people and we would like to examine the various facets

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of the proposed contact to determine the feasibility of a REINIX mission. On a map of the Ukraine provided by AMBASSADOR 2 possible routes were discussed for the infiltration. In order of their acceptability they were (a) the Caucasus (b) the Baltic area (c) the Black Sea and (d) Moldavian-Rumanian border.

4. The best potential internal contact at this time is the post office lead. According to AMBASSADOR 2, this contact is an elderly woman known to him for many years. If she is still alive, she would be in a position of responsibility in the Soviet Post Office in LVOV. This person has been a career postal employee and there is no reason to suspect that she was not allowed to continue her vocation. AMBASSADOR 2 knows her as an ardent Ukrainian Nationalist and feels that she in some way could have been responsible for the vitriolic anti-regime letters emanating from LVOV and arriving in the West. The content of these letters, as told to the undersigned case officer, would have meant at least 15-20 years in Siberia if they were censured by a Communist employee.

5. The existence of a potential courier was revealed when AMBASSADOR 2 indicated that he was in the possession of information outlining the movement of a railroad employee between CHADKOV, Poland and LVOV. At the present time the railroad employee is engaged in delivering packages to his friend's mother residing in LVOV. His friend, who lives in the United States, mails packages to CHADKOV. They are retrieved by the railroad employee and hand-carried to LVOV. This method does not pinpoint the actual recipient of the package and allows for a variety of items to be transmitted. When asked by the undersigned why a person should jeopardize his own safety to deliver restricted material in such a manner, AMBASSADOR 2 stated that the person in the United States saved the life of the railroad employee during World War II and the latter has accepted this method as a repayment of the moral obligation.

6. A link also has been uncovered between LVOV and KIEV according to information contained in outstanding letters. This route is covered by a "transport driver" (probably truck) three times a week. It is interesting to note that this potential contact also uses his trips to carry blackmarket goods to KIEV from LVOV since the rate of return is much better in KIEV. Asked where the blackmarket supplies came from, AMBASSADOR 2 indicated that a large portion of it was contained in packages received by the driver's mother from the West.

The truck driver is evidently in the employ of the government since the letters indicated that the trips were authorized under a "Komandirovka."

7. A bookkeeper employed by a sugar combine in Khodoviv has indicated through letters to his brother residing in the United States that there is a potential for doing anti-Communist work in the Ukraine. From the general tone of the letters, AMBASSADOR 2 feels, without reservation, that the man in Khodoviv would receive anyone we sent in, providing we could establish REINIX files. Nothing further is known about this contact.

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8. During the entire course of the conference, AMBASSADOR 2 was enthusiastic about the work under discussion. He added, however, that before we can discuss the details of any operation we must first get the agent. Once he is on board, then the level of the contacts can be tailored to meet his mentality. Generally, AMBASSADOR 2 felt that the first mission should be a money supply and a system of S/W for contact with us. He agreed to supply accommodation addresses in Canada and the United States. However, he felt, as does the undersigned, that S/W is too slow to permit any effective building of a "net." His solution would be to have our action agent bring out 2 or 3 persons who have lived continuously under the Soviets, give them radio training and send them back as soon as possible.

Returning to the problem of agent-recruiting, AMBASSADOR 2 said AMBASSADOR 1 had undertaken his spotting trip and would return in about two weeks. He felt that the United States' effort would not be too fruitful. When asked about the potential in Australia, he said he had no way of knowing, but he did have a contact there. This contact is not known to him personally, but rather through the exchange of letters. He felt reluctant about giving a letter of introduction to the Australian, but would consider it.

He was told we would continue in our effort to locate a potential action-agent type, however, the undersigned told him that the person may not be of the AMBASSADOR 1 organization. AMBASSADOR 2 said this did not make any difference to him as long as the necessary operational contacts were made. In fact he added, that he thought that he knew three potential candidates among the COM/W membership.

9. In response to a request by [] [] [], another meeting was set up for 12 June 1956 at which time BR/SCP would meet AMBASSADOR 2. AMBASSADOR 15 will telephone the undersigned as to the place and time.

[] [] []
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